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Abstract Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which lever-
ages the pervasive smartphones to efficiently collect and
upload sensing data, enabling numerous novel applica-
tions. To achieve good service quality for a crowd sensing
application, incentive mechanisms are necessary for at-
tracting more user participation. Most of existing mecha-
nisms apply only for the budget-constraint scenario where
the platform (the crowd sensing organizer) has a budget
limit. On the contrary, we focus on a different scenario
where the platform has a service limit. Based on the
offline and online auction model, we consider a general
problem: users submit their private profiles to the plat-
form, and the platform aims at selecting a subset of users
before a specified deadline for minimizing the total pay-
ment while a specific service can be completed. Specially,
we design offline and online service-constraint incentive
mechanisms for the case where the value function of se-
lected users is monotone submodular. The mechanisms
are individual rationality, task feasibility, computational
efficiency, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty, constant
frugality, and also performs well in practice. Finally, we
use extensive simulations to demonstrate the theoretical
properties of our mechanisms.
Keywords Crowd sensing · Service constraint ·
Incentive mechanisms · Online auction
1 Introduction
Crowd sensing is a new paradigm, which utilizes perva-
sive smartphones to efficiently collect and upload data.
Nowadays, the proliferation of smartphones makes it pos-
sible to provide a new opportunity for extending from
the virtual space (online social networks) to a larger real
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physical world (Internet of Things), making users’ contri-
butions easier and omnipresent, such as Nericell [13], Sig-
nalGruru [10], and VTrack [19] for providing omnipresent
traffic information, Ear-Phone [14] and NoiseTube [11]
for making noise maps.
While participating in these applications, smartphone
users consume their own resources such as battery and
computing power, and disclose their locations with po-
tential privacy threats. Thus, incentive mechanisms are
necessary to provide participants with enough rewards
for their participation costs. There are several incen-
tive mechanism studies for guaranteeing adequate user
participation in past literature. Generally, two scenar-
ios for these incentive mechanisms were considered: the
offline scenarios and online scenarios. For example, for
the offline scenarios, the authors of [21] designed truth-
ful incentive mechanisms for the user-centric model and
platform-centric model respectively. For the online sce-
narios, the authors of [1; 17; 18] designed incentive mech-
anisms based on the bidding model and the posted price
model for the additive utility function and submodu-
lar utility function respectively. However, all these works
only applied for the scenario with the budget constraint
where the platform with a fixed budget aims at maxi-
mizing the platform’s utility (e.g., the total value of the
tasks completed by selected users).
However, when the platform has a service limit in-
stead of a budget limit, which indicates that the plat-
form need to minimize the total payment for completing
the fixed service, these truthful incentive mechanisms be-
come infeasible. To address this problem, the authors of
[8; 17] investigate the frugality of incentive mechanisms
for the offline scenario, in which all of participating users
report their profiles, including the tasks they can com-
plete and the bids, to the platform in advance, and then
the platform selects a subset of users after collecting the
sensing profiles of all users to minimize its total payments
under the condition that the specific tasks can be com-
pleted. But these mechanisms only apply for the linear
value function of sensing tasks.
2In this paper, we concern a more general case, where
the value function of selected users’ services is mono-
tone submodular for service constraints, instead of ad-
ditive function supporting the homogeneous and hetero-
geneous tasks. We investigate the offline and online sce-
narios respectively for monotone submodular for service
constraints. For the offline scenario, the platform pro-
cures a optimal solution to a given sensing services while
minimizing the total payment at the end of a specified
deadline. For online scenario, where users always arrive
in a sequential order, and user availability changes over
time, so as to apply to most of the above crowd sensing
applications, the platform online determines whether to
select a user for a given sensing services while minimiz-
ing the total payment. For the two scenarios, we consider
users who are game-theoretic and seek to make strategy
(possible report a false cost or arrival/departure time) to
maximize their individual utility in equilibrium. Thus,
the problem of selecting feasible users while minimizing
the total payment can be modeled as the offline and on-
line auctions under the service and time constraints.
For the offline scenario, we adopt a “myopic” way
to select the optimal users to minimize the total pay-
ment. As long as the utility function satisfies the sub-
moduarity, a natural diminishing returns condition, the
mechanism satisfy the following critical properties: 1)
Computational Efficiency: the auction can determine the
winners and payments in polynomial time; 2) Individual
Rationality: each user can expect a non-negative utility
by participating in the auction; 3) Service Constraint:
It ensures the the platform’s service constraint is not
violated. In this paper, service constraint requires the
mechanism to satisfy: V (S) = R; 4) Truthfulness: no
mobile user can benefit from cheating about its true valu-
ation on its cost of participation. For the online scenario,
we apply a multiple-stage sampling-accepting process to
solicit bids from users. At every stage the mechanism
allocates sensing tasks to an arriving smartphone user
only if his marginal utility is not less than a certain
threshold density that has been computed using previ-
ous users’ bids and profiles as the sample set until the
service is completed. The threshold density is calculated
in a manner that guarantees the above desirable per-
formance properties of the offline mechanism. Besides,
the online mechanism also satisfies Constant Frugality:
The mechanisms have constant frugality ratio, i.e., if it
announces the fixed services with the value R in expec-
tation while guaranteeing that the total payment is no
more than the minimum cost required to achieve γR ser-
vices in the offline scenario. The main contributions of
this paper are summarized as follows:
– We design a service-constraint offline and online in-
centive mechanisms to ensure the minimal payment
of the platform for performing the required services
respectively.
– We rigorously prove that these incentive mechanisms
are satisfying the above desirable performances. We
also evaluate the performance and validate their the-
oretical properties via extensive simulations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we briefly discuss the related work and motiva-
tion. In Section 3, we present our system model and our
design goals. In Section 4 and Section 5, we design two
service-constraint based incentive mechanisms for the of-
fline and online scenario respectively, followed by the per-
formance evaluation in 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes
remarks.
2 Background and Related Work
There are growing interest in investigating the incentives
for users in online crowd sensing applications. For exam-
ples, the authors of [12; 15] study other, non-monetary
incentives that could improve the quality of users’ per-
formance. The authors of [4] apply no regret learning to
better understand users’ behavior and improve the re-
sults of sensing information aggregation from crowds. In
contrast, the authors of [20] study the money incentives
to maximize tasks by using bandit algorithms. While it
is a natural approach, they leave room for frameworks
that allow better theoretical guarantees as used in this
paper. The authors of [7] study an orthogonal problem
and present an algorithmic framework for matching users
with requesters based on their skills in crowd sensing ap-
plications.
Based on these frameworks, there are two classes of
different model studied extensively. One is to design the
budget-constraint truthful incentive mechanisms for stim-
ulating adequate users to participate in crowd sensing
applications. For example, the authors of [1; 17; 18; 21]
designed truthful incentive mechanisms for the offline
and online scenarios for maximizing the platform’s util-
ity. But these works fail to handle the incentive prob-
lem of extensive user participation under the service con-
straint. The other is to design service-constraint incen-
tive mechanisms for soliciting users’ true costs. For ex-
ample, the authors of [8; 17] investigates the frugality
of incentive mechanisms for the offline scenario with the
homogeneous and heterogeneous tasks. But they do not
propose feasible truthful incentive mechanisms for mini-
mizing the total payment. On the contrary, in this paper,
we are interested in studying minimizing payment online
incentive mechanisms under given service constraint for
the offline and online scenarios, where the value function
of selected users’ services is monotone submodular for
service constraints.
3 System Model and Problem Formulation
33.1 System Model
We focus on crowd sensing applications with the goal to
monitor some spatial phenomenon, such as air quality
or traffic. We consider the following crowd sensing sys-
tem model illustrated in Fig. 1. The system consists of a
crowd sensing application platform, which resides in the
cloud and consists of multiple sensing servers, and many
mobile device users, which are connected to the cloud
by cellular networks (e.g., GSM/3G/4G) or WiFi con-
nections. The platform first publicizes a crowd sensing
campaign in an area of interest (AoI), aiming at finding
some users to complete a required utility value R reflect-
ing service quality (given announced services). Then a
set of users U = {1, 2, · · · , n} interested in the campaign
report their profiles to the platform. Finally, the plat-
form selects a feasible subset of users to complete the
given service before the deadline T .
The platform is only interested in minimizing the to-
tal payment to the selected users under the given service
limit. We denote the total services of the campaign as a
finite set of locations, Γ = {τ1, τ2, · · · , τm}, where each
τi ∈ Γ could, e.g., denote a zip code or more fine grained
street address, depending on the crowd sensing applica-
tion. Each user can sense a subset Γi of Γ (Γi ⊆ Γ ) like
the number of locations depending on her geolocation or
mobility as well as the type of device used, and have the
cost ci corresponding to Γi. All these information form
the profile of user i, i.e., Pi = (ci, Γi). Since smartphones
are owned by different users, it is reasonable to assume
that users are selfish but rational. Hence each user only
wants to maximize its own utility, and will not partici-
pate in the campaign unless there is sufficient incentive.
In this paper, we study two scenarios: the offline sce-
nario and online scenario, where the value function of se-
lected users’ services is monotone submodular for service
constraints. In the offline scenario, all of participating
users report their profiles to the platform synchronously,
and then the platform allocates services to a subset of
users by considering the profiles of all users at once. Dif-
ferent from the batched and synchronized manner in the
offline scenario, the interactive process in the online sce-
nario is sequential and asynchronous. Each user arrives
in a sequential order and submits its profile. Receiving
the profile, the platform must make an irrevocable de-
cision about how much payment to pay to each arrival
user before the user departs until reaching the service
quality required. We assume that in each time step, a
single user appears and the platform makes a decision
that is based on the information it has about the user
and the history of the previous i − 1 stages. Generally,
there are three classes of user models: the i.i.d. model,
the secretary model, and the adversarial model. The first
model means that at each time step the costs and val-
ues of users are drawn from some unknown distributions.
The second model means that the users’ costs are chosen
by an adversary, however their arrival order is a permu-
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Fig. 1 Our crowd sensing system framework.
tation that is drawn uniformly at random from the set of
all possible permutations. In the third model, the users’
costs and their arrival order are chosen by an adversary.
Note that in the third model, although the adversary
cannot observe the actions the mechanism takes, since
it has full knowledge, the adversary chooses the worst
arrival order and costs. Thereby, the mechanism cannot
obtain the optimal solutions. Thus, in this paper, we only
account for the two models with respect to the distribu-
tion of users, described in increasing order of generality:
the i.i.d.model and the secretary model.
3.2 Problem Formulation
We model the above service-constraint based interactive
process between the platform and users as an auction
with service and time constraints. Receiving the crowd
sensing campaign from the platform, each user i pro-
vides its profile Pi = (ci, Γi) to the platform so as to
expect a payment in return for its service. Since we as-
sume that users are game-theoretic and seek to make
strategy to maximize their individual utility in equilib-
rium. Note that in its profile, only its service Γi is true so
that the platform can identify whether the given services
are fulfilled. That is, user i can misreport his cost, since
his cost is private and only known to himself. Thus, our
strategy space can allow user i to declare Pˆi = (bi, Γi),
where bi is a reserve price or a bid made by user i so as
to sell its service. Assume that the platform has given
announced services denoted as a utility value U0 that it
is willing to achieve. In order to complete the required
sensing services, more formally, an offline/online mecha-
nismM = (f, p), which consists of an allocation function
f : Rn+ → 2
[n] and a payment function p : Rn+ → R
n
+,
is needed. That is, for users’ Pˆ = (Pˆ1, Pˆ2, · · · , Pˆn), the
allocation function computes an allocation of services for
a feasible subset of users S ⊆ U and the payment func-
tion returns a payment vector to feasible users. Thus, the
utility of user i is pi−ci if it is selected, 0 otherwise. The
platform expect to minimize the payments while achiev-
ing the quality of announced services, i.e.,
min
∑
i∈S
pi Subject to V (S) ≥ R
where V (S) is the monotone submodular value function
of services from the selected users S, illustrated in the
following definition.
4Definition 1 (Submodular Function) Let N be a fi-
nite set, a function V : 2Ω →R is submodular if V (S ∪
{i})− V (S) ≥ V (T ∪ {i}) − V (T ), ∀S ⊆ T ⊆ Ω, where
R is the set of reals.
4 Offline Mechanism under the Service
Constraint
In this section, we present an offline mechanism under
the service constraint, satisfying the previous desirable
properties.
For crowd sensing applications in the offline scenario,
the authors of [16; 20; 21] apply the proportional share
allocation rule proposed in [16] to address the exten-
sive user participation issue. However, the mechanism
only applies for the offline scenario with the budget con-
straint. To address this problem, we present a service-
constraint offline incentive mechanism that satisfies the
previous desirable properties. Illustrated in Algorithm 1,
our mechanism consists of two phases: the winner selec-
tion phase and the payment determination phase.
Algorithm 1 OMS// An Offline Mechanism for the Ser-
vice constraint
Input: User set U , the service constraint R.
Output: The set of winners S.
// Phase 1: Winner selection under services R
1: S ← ∅; i← argmaxj∈U Vj(S)/bj ;
2: while V (S) < R do
3: S ← S ∪ i;
4: i← argmaxj∈U\S(Vj(S)/bj);
5: end while
6: B ←
∑
j∈S bj ;
// Phase 2: Winner selection under budget B
7: S ← ∅; i← argmaxj∈U Vj(S)/bj ;
8: while Vi(S)/bi ≥ V (S ∪ i)/B do
9: S ← S ∪ i;
10: i← argmaxj∈U\S(Vj(S)/bj);
11: end while
// Phase 3: Payment determination
12: for each user i ∈ U do
13: pi ← 0;
14: end for
15: for each user i ∈ S do
16: U
′
← U\{i}; T ← ∅;
17: repeat
18: ij ← argmaxj∈U′\T (Vj(T )/bj);
19: pi ← max{pi,min{bi(j), ηi(j)}};
20: Tj−1 ← T ; T ← T ∪ {ij};
21: until V (T ) ≥ R
22: end for
23: return (S, p);
From Definition 1, we can know the utility function V
is submodular and derive the following sorting according
to increasing marginal contributions relative to their bids
from users’ set to find the largest k satisfying V (S∪k) <
R.
V1/b1 ≥ V2/b2 ≥ · · · ≥ V|U|/b|U|, (1)
where Vk denotes Vk|Sk−1 (= V (Sk−1 ∪{k})−V (Sk−1)),
Sk = {1, 2, · · · , k}, and S0 = ∅. To calculate the pay-
ment of each user, we sort the users in U\{i} similarly
as follows:
Vi1(T0)/bi1 ≥ Vi2 (T1)/bi2 ≥ · · · ≥ Vin−1(Tn−2)/bin−1 ,
(2)
The marginal value of user i at the position j is
BVi(j)(Tj−1)/V (Tj), where B =
∑
j∈S bj . Assume that
k
′
to be the position of the last user ij ∈ U\{i}, such that
V (Tj) < R. To guarantee the truthfulness, each winner
should be given the payment of the critical value. This
indicates that user i can not win the auction if it reports
higher than this critical value. More details are given in
Algorithm 1, where bi(j) = Vi(j)(Tj−1)bij/Vij (Tj−1) and
ηi(j) = Vi(j)(Tj−1)B/V (Tj−1 ∪ {i}).
Since the OMSmechanism is very similar with MSens-
ing in [16; 21], only with three differences. The one is
that the services allocated to the winners is a constraint
instead of a factor in the objective function. The sec-
ond one is that OMS is a frugal mechanism instead of a
budget constraint mechanism, hence introducing line 6
of Algorithm 1. But these lines’ introduction has no im-
pact on the following desirable properties. Thus, putting
these together, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1 The OMS mechanism satisfies individual
rationality, computational efficiency, service feasibility,
and truthfulness under the offline scenario.
5 Online Mechanism under the Service
Constraint
In this section, we present an online mechanism for the
service-constraint online scenario, satisfying all desirable
properties. To facilitate understanding, it is also assumed
that users arrive in a sequential order. But our mecha-
nism can easily apply generally or be extended to an
random online scenario.
5.1 Service-Constraint Online Mechanism Design
An online mechanism needs to overcome several nontriv-
ial challenges. First, the users’ costs are unknown and
need to be elicited in a truthful reporting manner. Sec-
ond, an announced services should be completed before
the deadline. Finally, the mechanism needs to tackle the
5online arrival of the users. To achieve good frugality, pre-
vious online solutions and generalized secretary problems
[6; 3; 17; 9] is via sampling: the first batch of the input
is rejected and used as a sample which enables making
an informed decision on the rest of the users. Since users
are likely to be discouraged to sense data knowing the
pricing mechanism will automatically reject their bid. In
other words, those users arriving early have no incentive
to report their bids to the platform, which may delay the
users’ completion or even lead to task starvation, i.e.,
the consumer sovereignty issue in economics. Although
the author of [9] adopts a multi-stage sampling-accepting
process, it applies Dynkin’s algorithm [5] for the classic
secretary problem at the initial stage. Obviously, this so-
lution also cannot ensure the above task-starvation issue,
since Dynkin’s algorithm adopts a two-stage sampling-
accepting process.
To address the above challenges, we introduce a multi-
stage sampling-accepting process to design our online in-
centive mechanism. At each stage, based on the above
submodularity, the mechanismmaintains a density thres-
hold which is used to decide whether to accept the users’
bids. The mechanism dynamically increases the sample
size and learns a budget that are enough to allocate users
for fulfilling the required services, then apply this budget
to compute a density threshold by applying budget feasi-
ble mechanisms, and finally apply this density threshold
for making further decisions.
Specifically, our mechanism (see Algorithm 2) iter-
ates over qi ∈ {0, 1, · · · , ⌈logT ⌉} and at every time step
qi, a required stage-service of R
′
= R/2i is applied to al-
locate sensing services (illustrated in Fig. 2). This means
that R
′
services should be allocated before the end of
this stage. Finally, the required services R should be al-
located before the end of the deadline T . At the begin-
ning of the mechanism, we introduce a small value ε as
initial density threshold. We assume that the marginal
value of user i (i /∈) is Vi(S) = V (S ∪ {i}), where S is
selected users’ set. In the sequel, as long as the arrival
user’s marginal density Vi(S)
bi
is not less than the current
threshold density value ρ∗ and the budget has not been
exhausted, the mechanism allocates service to it. Mean-
while, we give user i a payment Vi(S)/ρ
∗, and add this
user to the set of selected users S.
In the computation of the density threshold for the
mechanism, we first find the maximal density for fulfill-
ing δR
′
services from the sample set S
′
. Then the pro-
cess is repeated by using a simple greedy manner un-
til all of δR
′
services are allocated. The greedy manner
sorts users according to their density, preferentially al-
locates services to users with higher density. Here, we
set δ to blow up the required stage services so that the
constant blowup services can be allocated at the next
stage. Furthermore, we compute the total payment for
fulfilling the constant blowup services. Futhermore, the
algorithm calls the following the budget feasible mecha-
nism for submodular function and then sets the density
Algorithm 2 SOS// Service-constraint Online incentive
mechanism under a Sequential arrival model
Input: Service constraint R, sensing task deadlines T
1: (t, T
′
, R
′
, S
′
, ρ∗, S)← (1, T
2⌊log2 T⌋
, R
2⌊log2 T⌋
, ∅, ε, ∅);
2: for t ≤ T do
3: if there is a user i arriving at time step t then
4: if bi ≤ Vi(S)/ρ
∗ and V (S) < R
′
then
5: pi ← Vi(S)/ρ
∗, S = S ∪ {i};
6: else
7: pi ← 0;
8: end if
9: S
′
← S
′
∪ {i};
10: end if
11: if t = ⌊T
′
⌋ then
12: Calculate ρ∗ ← getDensityThreshold(R
′
, S
′
);
13: set R
′
← 2R
′
, T
′
← 2T
′
;
14: end if
15: t← t+ 1;
16: end for
1 2 3
3210
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Fig. 2 Illustration of a multi-stage sample process
with deadlines T . (a)Budget constraints over quantiles;
(b)Quantiles over quantiles.
threshold to be ρ/ν. ν is introduced to guarantee enough
users selected and avoid the waste of payment.
The above budget feasible mechanism for submodu-
lar function is an offline mechanism proposed in [16]. It
adopts a proportional share allocation rule [16] to com-
pute the density threshold from the sample set S
′
and
the budget B
′
. First of all, users are sorted according
to their increasing marginal densities. In this sorting the
(i+ 1)-th user is the user j such that Vj(Si)/bj is maxi-
mized over S
′
\ Si, where Si = {1, 2, · · · , i} and S0 = ∅.
Considering the submodularity of V , this sorting implies
that V1(S0)
b1
≥ V2(S1)
b2
≥ · · · ≥
V
|S
′
|
(S
|S
′
|−1
)
b
|S
′
|
.
Then, the computation process adopts a greedy strat-
egy. That is, according to increasing marginal contribu-
tions relative to their bids from the sample set to find
the largest k satisfying bk∗ ≤
R
′
Vk(Sk−1)
V (Sk)
. Furthermore,
we can obtain the payment threshold estimated based
on every sample set S
′
with the privacy profile of users
and the allocated stage-budget R
′
. Finally, we set the
density threshold to be V (Sk)
δR
′ . The detailed computation
of the threshold density is illustrated in Algorithm 3 and
Fig. 2.
We now prove that our mechanism satisfies the de-
sirable properties as follows:
Lemma 1 The SOS mechanism is incentive compatible
or truthful.
Proof To see that bid-independent auctions are truthful,
here consider a user i with cost of ci that arrives at some
6Algorithm 3 getDensityThreshold
Input: Sample user set S
′
, the stage-service R
′
.
Output: The threshold density ρ.
1: Initialize: J
′
← ∅; i← argmax
j∈S
′
Vj(J )
bj
;
2: while V (J ) < δR
′
do
3: J ← J ∪ {i};
4: Compute i← argmax
j∈S
′
\J
Vj(J )
bj
;
5: end while
6: B
′
←
∑
j∈J bj ;
7: ρ← getFeasibleDensity(B
′
, S
′
);
8: return ρ/ν;
Algorithm 4 getFeasibleDensity [16]
Input: Sample user set S
′
, the budget B
′
.
Output: The threshold density ρ.
1: Initialize: J
′
← ∅; i← argmax
j∈S
′
Vj(J )
bj
;
2: while bi ≤
B
′
Vi(J )
V (J∪{i})
and V (J ) ≤ B
′
do
3: J ← J ∪ {i};
4: Compute i← argmax
j∈S
′
\J
Vj(J )
bj
;
5: end while
6: ρ← V (J )/B
′
;
7: return ρ;
stage for which the threshold density was set to ρ∗. If by
the time the user arrives there are no remaining required
stage services, then the user’s cost declaration will not
affect the allocation of the mechanism and thus cannot
improve his utility by submitting a false cost. Otherwise,
assume there are remaining required stage services by the
time the user arrives. In case ci ≤ Vi(S)/ρ∗, reporting
any cost below Vi(S)/ρ
∗ wouldn’t make a difference in
the user’s allocation and payment and his utility for each
assignment would be Vi(S)/ρ
∗− ci ≥ 0. Declaring a cost
above Vi(S)/ρ
∗ would make the user lose the auction,
and his utility would be 0. In case ci > Vi(S)/ρ
∗, declar-
ing any cost above i(S)/ρ
∗ would leave the user unallo-
cated with utility 0. If the user declares a cost lower than
Vi(S)/ρ∗ he will be allocated. In such a case, however, his
utility will be negative. Thus the user’s utility is always
maximized by reporting his true cost: bi = ci. Putting
these discussions together, the SOS mechanism satisfies
bid-independence. According to Proposition 2.1 in [2],
i.e., if and only if an online auction is bid-independent,
it is truthful. Thus, Lemma 1 holds.
Lemma 2 The SOS mechanism is service feasible.
Proof At each stage t ∈ {0, 1, · · · , ⌊log2 T ⌋, ⌊log2 T ⌋ +
1}, the mechanism uses a stage-service of R
′
= 2
t−1R
2⌊log2 T⌋
.
From the lines 4-5 of Algorithm 2, we can see that it is
guaranteed that the current total allocated services does
not exceed the stage-service R
′
. Specially, the service
constraint of the last stage is R. Therefore, every stage
is service feasible, and when the deadline T arrives, the
total allocated services does not exceed R. It is possible
that the total required services can not be fulfilled. To
the end, we compute the minimal cost for fulfilling a
constant blowup of the required services by a frugal ratio
δ (see Algorithm 3). As such, R/2 required services could
be allocated at the last stage while the total payment is
no more than the budget B. Thereby, the mechanism
can guarantee that each stage uses minimal payments to
achieving the required stage services by blowing up to
δR
′
until the total required services are fulfilled. Thus,
Lemma 2 holds.
Lemma 3 The SOS mechanism is computational effi-
cient.
Proof Since the mechanism runs online, we only need
to focus on the computation complexity at each time
step t = {1, 2, · · · , T }. Computing the marginal value of
user i takes O(Γi) time, which is at most O(m). Thus,
the running time of computing the allocation and pay-
ment of user i (lines 3-10 of Algorithm 2) is bounded by
O(m). Next, we analyze the complexity of computing the
density threshold, namely Algorithm 3. Finding the user
with maximum marginal density takes O(m|S
′
|) time.
Since there are m tasks and each selected user should
contribute at least one new task, the number of winners
is at most min{m, |S
′
|}. Thus, the running time of lines
1-6 of Algorithm 3 is bounded by O(m|S
′
|min{m, |S
′
|}).
The running time of line 7 of Algorithm 3 is the same
as of lines 1-6 of Algorithm 3. Thus, the computation
complexity at each time step (lines 3-15) is bounded by
O(m|S
′
|min{m, |S
′
|}). At the last stage, the sample set
S
′
has the maximum number of samples, being n/2 with
high probability. Thus, the computation complexity at
each time step is bounded by O(mnmin{m,n}). Thus,
Lemma 3 holds.
Lemma 4 The SOS mechanism is individually rational.
Proof From the lines 4-7 of Algorithm 2, we can see that
pi ≥ bi if i ∈ S, otherwise pi = 0. Therefore, we have
individual gain ui ≥ 0. Thus, Lemma 4 holds.
Lemma 5 The SOS mechanism satisfies the consumer
sovereignty.
Proof Each stage is an accepting process as well as a
sampling process ready for the next stage. As a result,
users are not automatically rejected during the sampling
process, and are allocated as long as their marginal den-
sities are not less than the current threshold density,
and the allocated stage services has not been exhausted.
Thus, Lemma 5 holds.
If the stage services could be achieved at each stage,
then R required services would be allocated finally. Since
our SOS mechanism consists of multiple stages, and dy-
namically increases the stage services, it only needs to
prove that R/2 required services could be allocated at
the last stage while the total payment is no more than
7the budget B. Thereby, the mechanism can guarantee
that each stage uses minimal payments to achieving the
required stage services by blowing up to δR
′
until the to-
tal required services are fulfilled. The frugality ratio for
achieving the required services would be δ, since at the
last stage the budget B is the minimal cost for fulfilling
the required stage services δR
′
= δR/2 according to Al-
gorithm 3. The mechanism for minimizing payments is
originated from the observations that the stage-service
constraint at each stage can be changed into the budget
constraint at the correspondent stage. If we show that at
least R/2 required services could be allocated at the last
stage under the budget constraint B, then it is equiv-
alent to that R/2 required services could be allocated
while the total payment is no more than B. This means
that the frugality ratio for achieving the required services
is δ.
Lemma 6 The SOS mechanism satisfies O(1)-compet-
itive, i.e., constant frugal ratio. Specifically, under i.i.d.
model, we can achieve the announced services from the
platform when the frugal ratio δ = 8. Under the secretary
model, we can achieve the announced services from the
platform when the frugal ratio δ = 24.
The detailed proof is given in Appendix A. From the
above lemmas, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 2 The SOS mechanism satisfies computational
efficiency, individual rationality, service feasibility, truth-
fulness, consumer sovereignty, and constant frugality un-
der a sequential arrival model.
6 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our service-constraint
mechanisms, we implemented the OMS and SOS mecha-
nisms, and compared them against the random mech-
anism, i.e., uses a simple greedy algorithm like Algo-
rithm 3, which adopts a naive strategy for rewarding
users based on an uninformed fixed bid threshold. The
performance metrics include the frugal ratio, the running
time, and the platform’s value.
6.1 Simulation Setup
We set the deadline (T) to 1800s, and vary the required
services (R) from 200 to 2000 with the increment of 200.
Users arrive according to a Poisson process in time with
arrival rate λ. We vary λ from 0.2 to 1 with the increment
of 0.2. The sensing range of each sensor is set to 7 me-
ters. The cost of each user is uniformly distributed over
[1, 10]. The initial density threshold (ǫ) of Algorithm 1
and 4 is set to 1. Note that this threshold could be an
empirical value for real applications. All the simulations
were run on a PC with 1.7 GHz CPU and 8 GB mem-
ory. Each measurement is averaged over 100 instances.
All the simulations were run on a PC with 1.7 GHz CPU
and 8 GB memory. Each measurement is averaged over
100 instances.
6.2 Evaluation Results
We first evaluate the frugal ratio’s impact on the OMS
and SOS mechanisms. Then when the frugal ratio is
fixed, we evaluate their performances against the ran-
dom mechanism.
Comparison on total payments: The total payments
of all evaluated mechanisms increase with the value of
required services. From Fig. 3, we can observe that the
payments of the SOS mechanism (δ = 6) is lower than
optimal offline mechanism with 6R services. Note that, at
most 4107 services can be completed by the OMS mech-
anism) in our simulations due to the limit of the number
of arrival users, and the 801 services can be completed
by the the SOS mechanism (δ = 6) and the platform’s
payment is 4657.5 when the value of required services
is set as 800, while the 3603 services can be completed
by OMS, and the platform’s payment is 13940 under
there are 6R = 4801 required services. The payment
of SOS mechanism is much lower than one of mecha-
nism. This shows that the “realistic” frugality ratio is
less than 6, which is consistent with our theoretical anal-
ysis in Lemma 6. Thus, as the required services increase,
the mechanism SOS have lower payments than the OMS
mechanism. However, as the value of the required ser-
vices increases, the payments of the mechanism SOS are
larger than the OMS mechanism. It is because there is
a limit of the number of available users in the system.
Additionally, Although Fig. 3 shows that random online
mechanism has lower payments than our mechanisms,
our mechanisms ensure that required services are com-
pleted when there are enough users to select. When the
value of required services is equal to 1200, the services
completed by the random online mechanism are lower
than half of required services, i.e. 591.
Frugal ratio’s impact: Fig. 4(a) shows that the den-
sity threshold of each stage decreases as the frugal ratio δ
increases, thereby achieving much lower payments. The
density threshold of each stage tends to a constant when
the frugal ratio δ is larger than 8. Thus, the SOS mech-
anism learns a optimal density that achieves the mini-
mal payments meanwhile fulfilling required services. The
SOS mechanism can attain lower payment as the value
of δ increases. When the payments of the SOS mecha-
nism are lower than the payments, we call the value as
the frugal ratio. Fig. 4(b) shows that the total payments
of the platform converges towards a constant value with
the increase of the frugal ratio δ.
Required service value’s impact: Fig. 5(a) shows
that completed services of random online mechanism are
much lower that required services. However, the SOS
mechanism ensures that required services are completed
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δ = 6.
when there are enough users to select. When the value
of required services are more than the value 1000, SOS
mechanism completes all required services while OMS
mechanism does not complete 6R required services. It is
because that there is the limitation of available users in
simulation (here the number of available users is set as
838). However, the limit of the number of available users
has no impact on the SOS mechanism, because in SOS
mechanism only need to select 163 users to complete the
required services 2000, as shown in Fig. 5(b).
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have designed two incentive mech-
anisms to motivate smartphone users to participate in
crowd sensing application with the service constraint,
which is a new sensing paradigm allowing us to efficiently
collect data for achieving required service quality. We
first propose a OMS mechanism for the offline scenario.
Furthermore, we design a SOS mechanism for a sequen-
tial arrival model, where users arrive one by one online.
We also prove that the two mechanisms satisfy the above
desirable properties.
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A
Proof of Lemma 6:
Let S∗ be the set of users selected by the offline Algorithm
4 before the time T and the budget 2B, the value of S∗ is
V (S∗). The value density threshold of S∗ is ρ = V (S∗)/B.
S
′
is the sample set obtained at the time T/2. S∗1 = S
∗ ∩
S
′
and S∗2 = S
∗ ∩ {U \ S
′
}. S
′
1 is the set of users selected
from the sample set S
′
by Algorithm 4 before the time T
and the budget B, and S
′
2 is the set of users selected by
Algorithm 2 at the last stage. Let ρ
′
1 = V (S
′
1)/B be the
density computed using Algorithm 3 over S
′
and ρ∗ = ρ
′
1/ν
is the density threshold of the last stage. Assume that the
value of each user is at most maxi Vi ≤ V (S
∗)/ω.
Proof In the proof, we consider that the mechanism is con-
stant frugal from the two class model: I.I.D. and the Secretary
Model
Under I.I.D. Model, since the costs and values of all users
in U are i.i.d., they can be selected in the set S∗ with the same
probability. Thus, we have E[|S
′
1|] = E[|S
′
1|] = |S
∗|/2. Consid-
ering the submodularity of function V (S), it can be derived
that: E[V (S∗1 )] ≥ E[V (S
∗
2 )] ≥ V (S
∗)/2 = R/2. Since V (S
′
1)
is computed with the stage-budget B/2, it can be derived
that: E[V (S
′
1)] ≥ E[V (S
∗
1 )] ≥ V (S
∗)/2 = R/2 and E[ρ
′
1] ≥ ρ.
where the first inequality follows from the fact that V (S
′
1) is
the optimal solution computed by Algorithm 4. Therefore, we
only need to prove that the ratio of E[V (S
′
2)] to E[V (S
′
1)] is
at least a constant, then the SOS mechanism have a constant
frugal ratio. Only two cases can exist according to the total
payment to the selected users at the last stage.
According to Lemma 7 in [22], we have 1/2 − ( ν
1−2α
−
1)/ω−1/ν = 2α/ν. Thus, when ω is sufficiently large (at least
12), we can obtain a constant ratio of E[V (S
′
2)] to E[V (S
′
1)].
More importantly, the optimal ratio increases to 1/4 (i.e.,
2α/ν → 1/4) as ω increases.
From Lemma 9 in [22], we have E[V (S
′
1)] ≥
δR
4
. Further-
more, E[V (S
′
2)] ≥
2α
ν
E[V (S
′
1)] ≥
2α
ν
· δR
4
. According to the
previous discussions, to achieve the required services, the in-
equality E[V (S
′
2)] ≥ R/2 holds by setting
αδR
2ν
≥ R
2
. As such,
we have δ ≥ 2 · ν/2α ≥ 2× 4 = 8. Thus, we can set the frugal
ratio δ = 8 to achieve the required services.
Under the Secretary Model, let S∗ be the set of users
selected by the offline Algorithm 4 before the time T and
the budget B other than the budget 2B in the i.i.d. model.
According to Lemma 15 in [3], for sufficiently large ω, the
random variable |V (S∗1 )−V (S
∗
2 )| is bounded by V (S
∗)/2 with
a constant probability. Because of the submodularity of V ,
we have V (S∗1 )+ V (S
∗
2 ) ≥ V (S
∗). Thus, we easily obtain the
result: For sufficiently large ω, both V (S∗1 ) and V (S
∗
2 ) are at
least V (S∗)/4 with a constant probability. Putting the result
and Lemma 9 in [22] together, we have≥ V (S1)/2 ≥ V (S
∗)/8
Only two cases can exist according to the total payment to
the selected users at the last stage.
According to Lemma 10 in [22], we have 1/4 − ( 8ν
1−2α
−
1)/ω − 2/ν = 2α/ν. Thus, when ω is sufficiently large (at
least 12), we can obtain a constant ratio of V (S
′
2) to V (S
′
1).
More importantly, the optimal ratio increases to 1/12 (i.e.,
2α/ν → 1/12) as ω increases.
In terms of Lemma 9 in [22], we have V (S
′
1) ≥
δR
4
. Fur-
thermore, V (S
′
2) ≥
2α
ν
V (S
′
1) ≥
2α
ν
· δR
4
. According to the
previous discussions, to achieve the required services, the in-
equality V (S
′
2) ≥ R/2 holds by setting
αδR
2ν
≥ R
2
. As such,
we have δ ≥ 2 · ν/2α ≥ 2 × 12 = 24. Thus, we can set the
frugal ratio δ = 24 to achieve the required services.
Thus, the Lemma 6 holds.
